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Australia and New Zealand are often portrayed (by secularists and church 
figures alike) as godless nations where materialism, in both its philosophical and 
sociological guises, runs rife (see, e.g. Frame 2009). Census reports on religious 
identity are sometimes used to substantiate this image (e.g. the 'No Religion' 
category rose in Australia from 0.3% in 1947 to 18.7% in 2006, and in New 
Zealand from 0.7% in 1945 to 29.6% in 2001). Despite this, it has been argued-
by, e.g. Bouma (2006) and Matheson (2006)-that religion has not died out in 
Australia and New Zealand, but shows signs of renewal and revitalisation. In 
Australia in particular, a distinctive religious and spiritual ethos seems to have 
emerged. Borrowing the phrase 'a shy hope in the heart' used by Manning Clark 
to describe the ANZAC spirit, Bouma writes that this phrase aptly expresses the 
nature of Australian religion and spirituality: 'There is a profound shyness-yet 
a deeply grounded hope-held tenderly in the heart, in the heart of Australia' 
(2006: 2). Perhaps something similar can be said about the way in which the 
philosophical study of religion tends to be approached in Australasia: a spirit of 
openness and tentativeness, as opposed to one that is doctrinaire and dogmatic, 
has prevailed. 
Early Contributions 
If Samuel Alexander can be considered an Australian philosopher, despite 
leaving his home town of Sydney at the age of eighteen for Oxford, and never 
to return, his Space, Time, and Deity (1920) would count as the first substantial 
Australasian contribution to the philosophy of religion. Alexander developed a 
grand system of speculative metaphysics, one of the last of its kind, that was 
part of the widespread movement towards realism, and against Idealism, in 
philosophy. In Alexander's system the basic reality is spacetime, out of which 
everything evolves. This evolutionary system is marked by an ongoing process 
that is driven towards the production of new and increasingly complex qualities, 
particularly one that has yet to be realised, called 'Deity'. As in the process theism 
developed by his contemporary, A. N. Whitehead, Alexander thought of God 
as both existent and forever in process of realisation: 'God as actually possessing 
deity does not exist but is an ideal, is always becoming; but God as the whole 
Universe tending towards deity does exist' (1921: 428). 
On the Idealist side, W. R. Boyce Gibson arrived in Victoria in 1912 having 
already published God With Us (1909), a work heavily influenced by the German 
Idealist philosopher, Rudolf Eucken, and advocating a theistic version of 'personal 
Idealism' in opposition to both Absolute Idealism and naturalism. (See also 
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Gibson's four-part series on 'Problems of Spiritual Experience' in the 1924-25 
issues of the Australasian journal of Psychology and Philosophy [1924a, 1924b, 1924c, 
1925b]). Alexander ('Sandy') Boyce Gibson succeeded his father in the chair of 
philosophy at the University ofMelbourne in 1935 and also took a strong interest in 
the philosophy of religion, publishing after his retirement one book on the interplay 
between religious faith and doubt in Dostoevsky's life and novels, and another on 
becoming empirically acquainted with the non-empirical and thus overcoming the 
divide between theism and empiricism (Gibson 1970; 1973). 
Although John Anderson had little to offer the philosophy of religion, his 
atheism played an important role in setting up naturalism as the dominant 
paradigm in subsequent Australasian philosophy. Anderson rejected the traditional 
arguments for the existence of God (e.g. in a 1935 paper he discusses, and seeks 
to strengthen, the critique of the design argument offered in Hume's Dialogues 
concerning Natural Religion, though curiously he makes no appeal to evolutionary 
theory), but he did not attempt to derive his atheism from any arguments in the 
philosophy of religion, such as the argument from evil. Rather, his atheism was 
the product of a thoroughgoing empiricism and realism, according to which there 
is only one way of being, that of ordinary things in space and time, and hence 
there are no supernatural beings such as God. But it was Anderson's resolutely 
secular conception of education that was to give him greatest notoriety. Education, 
Anderson argued, is essentially concerned with free inquiry and critical thinking, 
whereas religion promotes dogmatism, servility and indoctrination, and so the two 
are flatly opposed. After public addresses espousing such views, Anderson was 
condemned by the Sydney press and church officials, and was even censured by the 
NSW Parliament (Baker 1979: 118-21). 
Natural Theology and Atheology 
Over the last few decades Australasian philosophers have made significant 
contributions to the projects of natural theology and atheology, where the case for 
and against the existence of God is assessed on the basis of rational argumentation 
alone, unaided by religious faith or divine revelation. A case in point is Peter 
Forrest (1996a), who under the banner of 'scientific theism' has attempted to 
show that belief in God is the best explanation of various features revealed by, or 
implicit in, modern science. Forrest engages in what he calls 'the apologetics of 
understanding', the project of defending theism by showing that it enables us to 
understand or explain various things (such as the world's beauty and its suitability 
for life) better than its rivals, especially naturalism. But the explanations posited 
by Forrest are not supernatural explanations: 'I am an antisupernaturalist without 
being a naturalist', he writes (1996: 2). Forrest's theism avoids the supernatural 
insofar as its eschews any violations of the laws of nature and any entities that 
do not have a precedent in well-confirmed scientific theories. More recently 
but more controversially, Forrest (2007) has defended a highly speculative and 
unorthodox conception of divinity where God (and not simply our conception 
of God) develops over time. On this view, God initially is neither personal nor 
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lovable, but is pure will and unrestricted agency. A series of events, however, 
results in God becoming a community of divine love, the Holy Trinity, with one 
of the Persons of this Trinity becoming fully human to show us divine love. 
Important contributions to each of'the big three' arguments for the existence of 
God have been made by Australasian philosophers. Barry Miller (1992) defends 
a version of the cosmological argument, relying not on the principle of sufficient 
reason, but on the premise that the existence of the universe or any of its parts 
(logically) could not be a brute fact. Subsequently, Miller went on to argue that the 
creator of the universe whose existence his earlier work attempted to demonstrate 
is not to be identified with the anthropomorphic God of perfect-being theology, 
but with the Thomistic God conceived as Subsistent Existence (identical with his 
existence) and thus as radically different from any other being, possible or actual 
(Miller 1996). In the final part of his 'trilogy' (Miller 2002), he defends the view, 
presupposed in the idea of Subsistent Existence, that existence is a real property of 
individuals and 'exists' is a first-level predicable. 
Graham Oppy, on the other side of the theist/atheist divide, engaged in prolonged 
debate in the journals during the 1990s with William Lane Craig and others over 
the kalam cosmological argument. A useful but neglected question in debates of this 
sort is: When should someone who presents a philosophical argument be prepared 
to concede that their argument is unsuccessful? Oppy (2002) takes up this topic, 
and argues that Craig ought to admit that his kalam argument is a failure. Oppy 
has also considered and criticised some new versions of the cosmological argument 
advanced by Robert Koons, Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss. 
Mark Wynn (1999), at the time at the Australian Catholic University, offered 
a defence of the argument from design. But unlike traditional formulations of this 
argument, Wynn's argument is rooted in features of the world that are charged 
with valuational significance (e.g. the world's beauty and its tendency to produce 
richer and more complex material forms) and attempts to break away from 
anthropomorphic conceptions of God as a human artisan writ large. Nowadays, 
however, design arguments usually make appeal to fine-tuning, the fundamental 
structure and properties of the universe that are finely adjusted to allow for the 
existence of life. Fine-tuning arguments have come in for some heavy criticism at 
the hands of Australasian philosophers, including M. C. Bradley (2001) and Mark 
Colyvan, Graham Priest and Jay Garfield (2005). 
Somewhat peculiarly for a nation that takes pride in the empirical, Australia 
has witnessed a flurry of activity over the a priori ontological argument. Max 
Charlesworth (1965) led the way with a new translation of, and a running 
commentary on, Anselm's Proslogion and the texts of the subsequent debate between 
Anselm and Gaunilo. Soon thereafter Richard Campbell (1976) presented a new 
interpretation of Anselm's argument, and defended it against the objections of 
Gaunilo, Kant and others. But it was Graham Oppy's Ontological Arguments and 
Belief in God (1996) that raised the discussion to new heights, providing the most 
detailed and rigorous examination of the ontological argument to date. In this 
work Oppy develops and defends a general objection that is intended to apply to all 
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formulations of the argument (though this general objection was later recanted in 
Oppy 2001 and 2006), and concludes that 'ontological arguments are completely 
worthless: While the history and analysis of ontological arguments makes for 
interesting reading, the critical verdict of that reading is entirely negative' (1996: 
199). An equally negative conclusion is reached in Oppy's follow-up study, Arguing 
about Gods (2006a), where he examines classical and contemporary arguments 
for and against the existence of God, and concludes that 'no argument that has 
been constructed thus far provides those who have reasonable views about the 
existence of orthodoxly conceived monotheistic gods with the slightest reason 
to change their minds' (2006a: 425). The meticulous and thorough scholarship 
that lies behind these verdicts justifies the remark Paul Helm once made that, 'an 
"oppy" is clearly a creature with the eye of an eagle and the pen of a ready writer' 
(Helm 1997: 477). 
Across the Tasman, John Bishop in Believing by Faith (2007a) also thinks 
that the arguments of natural theology and natural atheology are unsuccessful. 
Specifically, Bishop holds that the core theistic truth-claims are 'evidentially 
ambiguous' in the sense that our total available evidence is equally viably 
interpreted either from a theistic perspective or an atheistic perspective. Given the 
evidential ambiguity of theism, argues Bishop, it can under certain circumstances 
be morally permissible to 'believe by faith', or to 'make a doxastic venture' in the 
direction of theistic faith-commitment. Bishop thus defends a modest version of 
fideism that is inspired by William James' 1896 lecture 'The Will to Believe', and 
defends it against various objections, including those put forward by 'hard-line' 
evidentialists, who insist that commitment to religious belief without evidential 
support can never be justified. 
Arguments from evil, of course, often play a crucial role in the atheologian's case 
against God, but since Australasian philosophers have made a quite distinctive 
contribution to this topic, it is dealt with under a separate entry. 
Miracles 
Australasian philosophers have also been active in discussions of miracles. Bruce 
Langtry, for example, challenged the arguments Hume and Mackie put forward 
against miracle-reports as evidence for theism (Langtry 1972, 1975, 1985, 
1988). Levine (1989) offers a more systematic explication of Hume's argument 
against justified belief in miracles, showing how it follows from Hume's analysis 
of causation. Hume's position on miracles, according to Levine, has not been 
properly understood, since its connection to his views on causation has never been 
adequately examined. Levine also argues, against Hume, that a justified true 
belief in the occurrence of an event justifiably thought to be a miracle is possible. 
Stephen Buckle (2001) also takes up Hume's case against belief in miracles as 
developed in Section X of the Enquiry (as well as Hume's case against the design 
argument in Section XI). Buckle spends much time in contextualising Hume's 
critique of religion, showing that the critique can properly be understood only 
if it is placed within the context of the wider sceptical argument of the Enquiry. 
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History of Philosophy of Religion 
Apart from these studies of Hume, other historical studies in philosophy of 
religion include Julian Young's Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion (2006). According 
to Young, Nietzsche's early thought, or his 'Wagnerianism', is communitarian 
(in the sense that the highest object of its concern is the flourishing of the 
community as a whole), and religious (for it holds that a community cannot 
flourish without a festive, communal religion). Young argues that this religious 
communitarianism is not, as is often thought, something that Nietzsche went 
on to renounce, but persists through the entirety of Nietzsche's writings. Young 
therefore interprets Nietzsche as a religious reformer rather than an enemy 
of religion, and as someone deeply concerned with community rather than 
an individualistic philosopher. Mention may also be made of the five-volume 
History of Western Philosophy of Religion (2009), edited by Oppy and Trakakis, 
and consisting of over 100 essays on philosophers and religious thinkers from 
ancient to contemporary times. 
Continental Philosophy of Religion 
A seminal publication in this area, in Australasia and beyond, is Kevin Hart's 
The Trespass of the Sign (1989, reissued 2000). At the time of publication, Hart 
was lecturing in Literary Studies at Deakin University, though he was already 
well-versed in both philosophy (completing his Ph.D. in philosophy at the 
University of Melbourne in 1986) and theology. By this time, also, Hart had 
converted to the Catholic Church (having grown up in an Anglican family), 
and he had (as he put it) 'gone continental' in his philosophical orientation, 'yet 
without repudiating what I had learned in the analytic tradition' (2000: xii). 
In many ways, then, Hart was well-positioned to see past the misconceptions 
about deconstruction and religious faith prevalent at the time. Unlike those 
who saw deconstruction as directed against theology as such, or as a refinement 
of the Nietzschean doctrine that God is dead, Hart offered deconstruction 
as 'an answer to the theological demand for a "non-metaphysical theology'" 
(2000: xxxv) of the sort that is found in the mystical and apophatic traditions 
of Christianity, thus rejecting Derrida's view that even mystical theology is 
embroiled in metaphysics. 
Since leaving for the U.S. in 2002, Hart has authored or edited works on 
Blanchot and the sacred (Hart 2004), on Derrida and religion (Hart and 
Sherwood 2005), on the experience of God (Hart and Wall 2005), on Marion's 
phenomenology and its relation to Christian theology (Hart 2007), and on the 
implications of Levinas' philosophy for Jewish-Christian dialogue (Hart and 
Signer 2010). Hart's students in Australia have gone on to make important 
contributions of their own, particularly Robyn Horner. In Rethinking God as 
Gift (2001), Horner looks at the two main protagonists in phenomenological 
discussions of the gift, Derrida and Marion, and the theological implications 
of the debate, particularly as it bears on the possibility of conceiving God as 
pure gift. (The 'theological turn' in phenomenology was made the subject of a 
